

IFP SECURITY CLUSTER
COUNTRY CASE STUDY: HAITI

ENSURING A FLEXIBLE EU
RESPONSE THROUGH
THE INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY

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December 2010

FRIDE
FUNDACIÓN
PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Y EL DIALOGO EXTERIOR



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ENSURING A FLEXIBLE EU RESPONSE THROUGH THE INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the many people that have shared valuable insights in interviews and informal discussions in Europe and in Haiti. Special thanks are extended to Pierre Richard Cajuste. May those who passed away in the tragic January 2010 earthquake rest in peace. I will never forget them.

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ACRONYMS

DG	Directorate General
DPC	Directorate for Civil Protection/Direction Protection Civile
EU	European Union
ECHO	European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
EUCO	EU Crisis Coordination Cell for Haiti earthquake
EUMS	EU Military Staff
CIVIPOL	Consulting and Service Company to the French Ministry of Interior in the areas of homeland security and civil protection
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civil Conduct and Planning Capability
FASP	Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
HNP	Haitian National Police
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IMG	International Management Group
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SITCEN	Situation Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti is trapped in a vicious circle between the country's progressive structural deterioration and recurrent emergencies. For the international community it is therefore imperative to address Haiti's short and the long-term needs, and to do so in an integrated way. The country's fragility and chronic instability require high degrees of flexibility from international donors.

The EU's policy framework increasingly reflects these challenges. In 2007 the EU launched the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in order to enhance its capacity in the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery after natural disasters. In Haiti – both pre- and post-earthquake – the IfS has allowed the EU to engage in the fields of conflict prevention, capacity building, community violence reduction, early recovery, livelihood improvement as well as political dialogue. Moreover, the EU has complemented its role as a development and humanitarian actor in Haiti with increased engagement in the field of security. This has been pursued in a complementary fashion with regard to the other actors on the ground, in particular MINUSTAH, so as to avoid duplication of efforts and mission competition.

The impact and consequences of the earthquake compound the enormous political, economic, social, and security challenges Haiti already faced before the devastating earthquake in January 2010. Prior to the disaster it was already clear that the structural transformation of the local political economy, including the crucial need for a feasible national strategy for socio-economic development and the political will and capacity to implement it, was the main challenge facing the country. In the light of the contested results of the November 2010 presidential and legislative elections, and the outbreak of violence throughout the country, international mediation might be required to find a solution for the ongoing crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Haiti is trapped in a vicious circle between the country's progressive structural deterioration and recurrent emergencies. The earthquake, which hit the country in January 2010 and killed more than 230,000 people,¹ is by far the most devastating example for this reality.² For the international community it is therefore imperative both to address the short and the long-term needs of the country, and to do so in an integrated way. The country's fragility and chronic instability require high degrees of flexibility from international donors.

Haiti is a fragile state as it is significantly susceptible to crisis in any of its sub-systems, notably the economy, the environment, the institutional set-up of the state and the underlying political settlement, along with the public health as well as the security and justice sectors.³ The Haitian state lacks legitimacy in all these domains.⁴ It does not deliver basic services nor is it able to provide security and safeguard the rule of law.⁵ Since September 2004, the integrated UN peace mission MINUSTAH⁶ has been on the ground to maintain security and stability, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In October 2010, the UN Security Council extended the mission's mandate until October 2010, with the intention of further renewal.⁷ Haiti is highly aid-dependent; approximately 70 per cent of its national budget is funded by foreign aid,⁸ and the vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty and human insecurity.

This report is a follow-up to the 2009 Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) publication 'What role for the EU? Finding a niche in the Haitian peacebuilding process'.⁹ One of the main conclusions of this previous report was that the improved security situation in Haiti could only prove sustainable in the mid- and long-term if the socioeconomic situation showed significant improvement; that is if the stability dividend translated into real livelihood improvement for the vast majority of Haitians. Before the devastating impact of the earthquake in January 2010 the structural transformation of the local political economy, including the crucial need for a feasible national strategy for socioeconomic development and the political will and capacity to implement it, already stood out as the main challenge. Originally, this report was meant to address support to decentralisation as one of the EU's priorities for Haiti's development and its implications for fragility and state- and peacebuilding.¹⁰ The consequences of the January 2010 earthquake required adapting this approach to Haiti's post-disaster situation. Nevertheless, many recommendations provided in 2009 remain valid and prove even more imperative under the aggravated circumstances the country is facing today.

Conflict affected and fragile contexts like Haiti pose innumerable challenges for effective international support. The risk for external actors involved in statebuilding to do harm undermining local processes of statebuilding is particularly high in such environments.¹¹ The flexibility to adapt quickly and efficiently to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground and the ability to combine short- with long-term instruments stand out among the most important challenges. This has been recognised by the European Union (EU), which over the last ten years

¹ Figures about victims are estimated. According to the source they oscillate between 220,000 and 250,000.

² On 12 January 2010, an earthquake of the magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale hit Haiti approximately 25 km from the capital, Port-au-Prince. Since then, the country has faced serious damages during the 2010 hurricane season and suffered the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in October 2010 with an estimated 1,900 victims as of the beginning of December 2010. In 2008, several hurricanes killed close to 1,000 people and caused material damages of approximately US \$1 billion.

³ See definition used by the Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE). See: Crisis States Workshop, London (March 2006). 'Crisis, Fragile and Failed States Definitions used by the CSRC', at <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf>

⁴ A state's legitimacy is the acceptance in society that the organisation and institutions that make up the state have the 'right to rule' (see OECD, 2010. *Do no harm. International support for statebuilding*. Paris: Conflict and Fragility Series. p. 47; R. Paris and T. D. Sisk. *The dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. London: Routledge. p. 14f). A state's performance, that is what it delivers or accomplishes, for example in terms of providing security, justice and basic services, is crucial to determine its legitimacy (OECD, 2010. Op. cit. p. 48).

⁵ OECD (2010). Op. cit. pp.18–19 and 48.

⁶ United Nations Stabilisation Mission (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti, according to its French acronym MINUSTAH). Currently, the mission has a military component of up to 8,940 troops and a police component of up to 4,391 officers.

⁷ UN Security Council resolution 1944 (2010).

⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG) (2010), 'Haiti: Stabilisation and reconstruction after the quake', Latin America/Caribbean Report N°32 – 31 March. According to ICG 70 per cent of this money is channelled through mainly international NGOs rather than the state.

⁹ J. Schünemann (2009), 'What role for the EU? Finding a niche in the Haitian peacebuilding process', Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) publication. Available at: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/What_role_for_the_EU_Finding_a_niche_in_the_Haitian_peacebuilding_process.pdf

¹⁰ Interviews in Haiti carried out in July/August 2009 mainly focused on this issue.

¹¹ OECD (2010). Op. cit.

has developed a solid policy framework as well as new instruments to respond to situations of fragility. In 2007, the EU launched the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in order to enhance its capacity in the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery after natural disasters. In Haiti – both pre- and post-earthquake – the IfS has allowed the EU to engage in conflict prevention, capacity building, community violence reduction, early recovery, livelihood improvement as well as political dialogue. One of the recommendations of the 2009 report noted that the full potential of the IfS had yet to be assessed by the international community. Since then the EU has bolstered support to Haiti through the IfS, especially since the acute crisis triggered by the earthquake.

The first section of this report gives a brief overview of the context of post-earthquake Haiti. In the following section it concentrates on the EU's engagement in Haiti, in particular through the Instrument for Stability.¹² Given that this is a follow-up report, recommendations provided in 2009 will be re-examined bearing in mind the new situation on the ground.

HAITI AFTER THE JANUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE

The January 2010 earthquake killed an estimated 250,000 people, including a number of senior government and UN officials, left hundreds of thousands injured and displaced approximately 1.5 million.¹³ Three million people – of a population of close to ten million – were directly affected, and the country's infrastructure, institutions and economy were devastated. The earthquake incurred urgent reconstruction costs estimated at \$11.5 billion and presented a significant setback for Haiti's overall development and a threat to stability. It destroyed over 80 per cent of Port-au-Prince and several towns and villages close by and flattened the seats of all three branches of government as well as fifteen of the seventeen ministries, 45 per cent of the police stations and a number of courts. A strong central authority is crucial for effective disaster response, but the destruction of the capital, key infrastructure and institutions exacerbated difficulties for a quick and efficient reaction.

In spite of Haiti's extreme disaster-vulnerability and the fact that emergency responses are staggeringly more costly, foreign aid for disaster preparedness and prevention including public information, awareness and civic education had consistently been low.¹⁴ It seemed the Haitian government as well as the international community would rather deal with one emergency at a time without developing a holistic approach.¹⁵

Almost one year after the earthquake, the Haitian government and the international community have still not found decent temporary or long-term shelter for the vast majority of displaced persons. International aid agencies pledged to construct 130,000 units of temporary housing, but so far only 10 per cent of the shelters have been built.¹⁶ Questions over land ownership are an additional obstacle. Hundreds of thousands still live in disintegrating provisional tent cities and makeshift huts, and continue to experience severe hardship¹⁷ and increasing crime, violence and sexual abuse. The concern that these camps would become Port-au-Prince shantytowns already seems to have become a reality.

¹² The information and qualitative analysis in this report is essentially based on primary data gathered in research interviews undertaken in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and Brussels between July 2009 and July 2010. It is complemented by secondary data collected through desk research drawing on relevant literature, media coverage, official policy documents and other reports. A field trip to Haiti in July 2009 allowed for interviewing and consulting representatives of the Haitian government and civil society, the EU delegation and MINUSTAH.

¹³ Among the dead were two outgoing senators, the chief of justice of the Haitian civil court, an archbishop, numerous senior Haitian officials, the entire civilian leadership of MINUSTAH, including its chief of mission, principal deputy chief of mission, political affairs and planning director and interim police (UNPOL), close to 100 UN personnel and 77 Haitian National Police (HNP) officers.

¹⁴ Donors contributed \$349 million between 1996 and 2006 to the Caribbean countries for emergency assistance and reconstruction, of which Haiti received \$167.2 million. While the amount spent on preparedness is not easily defined, the largest contributions \$56.9, \$72.6 and \$21.3 million were made in 2004, 2005 and 2006, in the year of and following a major disaster, Tropical Storm Jeanne of 2004. See: USAID (2008), 'Latin America and the Caribbean Selected Economic and Social Data', Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.

¹⁵ ICG (2010). Op. cit. p. 3.

¹⁶ 'Amid Slow Recovery, Haiti's Tent Cities remain', National Public Radio (NPR), 22 September 2010, Available at: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130047763>

¹⁷ 'Dix millions de personnes paient l'irresponsabilité de ceux qui gouvernent en Haïti' [Ten million people pay for the lack of responsibility of those who govern in Haiti], *Alterpresse*, 25 November 2010, Available at: <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article10298>.

Moreover, the security situation – fairly stable before the earthquake – has deteriorated significantly over recent months. Some 60 per cent of the prison population escaped due to the earthquake, including the armed gang leaders and members arrested and imprisoned in 2007.¹⁸ Some of them have been re-arrested by MINUSTAH and the HNP, but many gangsters have quickly regrouped, re-armed and moved back into their old strongholds engaging in diverse criminal activities, including rape, murder and robbery.¹⁹ On the other hand, post-quake Haiti is ever more vulnerable to increasing penetration by organised crime, in particular related to drug trafficking.

Social unrest occurred on various occasions due to political discontent and frustration, including violent demonstrations against the government as well as MINUSTAH.²⁰ The presidential and legislative elections held on 28 November and the contested results sparked further violence. In addition, there were violent protests against UN peacekeepers after the Nepalese contingent was accused of being responsible for the outbreak of the cholera epidemic.²¹

These circumstances only compound the enormous political, economic, social, and security challenges Haiti already faced before the disaster. From a local perspective, effective reconstruction requires strong leadership backed by a national consensus inclusive of the whole society including the private sector. Not only are these conditions not met, but recent events show a tendency towards deterioration of the situation and increasing political instability, partly due to political manipulation.

THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN HAITI

The EU has traditionally played the role of a development and humanitarian actor in Haiti and is one of the most important donors to the country.²² Within the last few years and in the light of the international debate about aid effectiveness as well as the EU's growing ambitions as a global actor, the EU has developed new policy frameworks²³ and instruments for dealing with situations of fragility, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Haiti was one of the pilot countries for testing the EU's response to fragility in 2008/2009. The overall aim of this exercise was to strengthen coordination between the Commission and member states at both headquarters and field level, increase coherence between diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and security activities and thus ensure greater aid effectiveness. An enhanced focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding also implied that the EU increase efforts to combine long-term and root-cause centred development cooperation with short-term measures and specific actions targeted at crisis response and peacebuilding including political dialogue on security sector reform (SSR).²⁴

In Haiti, the field of SSR shows a clear division of labour among the actors of the international community. The lead lies with MINUSTAH, the US and Canada while the EU does not carry out any joint SSR activities in Haiti. This is due to the country's lack of importance to Europe in geo-strategic terms,²⁵ which in turn explains why the EU has never deployed an ESDP mission to Haiti. In the past, the Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC) has discussed the deployment of a rule of law or customs and border mission, but interest from member states has remained low. With MINUSTAH on the ground, most European countries prefer to contribute via the UN and instead play a complementary role. MINUSTAH was particularly interested in receiving EU collaboration in the fields of corruption, drugs, and border and customs management, including communications in the border zone.²⁶

¹⁸ This comprises approximately 4,188 prisoners from the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince.

¹⁹ ICG (2010). Op. cit. p. 10.

²⁰ 'Haïti-Choléra/Agitations : Préal invite à « refuser la violence »' ['Haïti-Cholera/Unrest: Préal invites to "reject violence"'], *Alterpresse*, 17 November 2010, Available at: <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article10264>; 'Haïti/Elections : Jour de vote' ['Haïti/Elections: Election Day'], *Alterpresse*, 28 November 2010, Available at: <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article10316>

²¹ 'Haïti-Cholera/MINUSTAH : Manifestations contre les casques bleus dans le Nord et le Plateau Central' ['Haïti-Cholera/MINUSTAH: Demonstrations against blue helmets in the North and the Plateau Central'], *Alterpresse*, 15 November 2010, Available at: <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article10256>

²² See also J. Schünemann (2009). Op. cit.

²³ See, for example, Council of the European Union (2007), 'Council conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility'. Document 15118/07; Council of the European Union (2007), 'Council conclusions on security and development', Document 1509/07.

²⁴ For a more detailed elaboration on this topic see J. Schünemann (2009), Op. cit.

²⁵ In this regard it should not be forgotten that Europe is developing as a market for drugs that transit through the Caribbean. Increased instability in the Caribbean could therefore affect European security interests. Principally, policy has to achieve balance between early intervention in the trafficking routes and attacking the problem once within the borders.

²⁶ See also Schünemann (2009), Op. cit.

The earthquake in Haiti almost coincided with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. On the institutional level this translated into some important changes with regards to the EU's response. Catherine Ashton, Vice President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (FASP) was in charge of the overall coordination of the EU institutions involved. These are the EU's Situation Centre (SITCEN), responsible for collecting, analysing and redistributing information, the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection (ECHO), the Council General Secretariat, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Commission's Directorates General for Development and External Relations, including the Crisis Room.

The EU's humanitarian assistance after the earthquake amounts to a total of over €320 million (Member States and Commission). In order to assist with the non-humanitarian aspects of the relief effort -civil protection and humanitarian assistance being coordinated by MIC and ECHO- the Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 25 January to the High Representative's proposal to set up a crisis coordination cell in Brussels, called EUCO Haiti. The purpose of EUCO Haiti was to facilitate the coordination of EU response in the military and security domains, complementing existing arrangements for information exchange. EUCO Haiti collected information from the UN on its needs and from the Member States on their offers before trying to match them. It was also looking out for opportunities for synergies between Member States' offers, including in the field of transport. The cell also focused on situation awareness, information sharing and the information flow between actors in the field and the headquarters in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. EUCO was staffed by military and police experts from the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civil Conduct and Planning Capability (CPCC) and by SITCEN staff. Later on, 300 officers from the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) strengthened the cell.²⁷ The latter were deployed responding to a UN request for police units to join MINUSTAH and to assist it with its security role and for military units -mainly in the field of logistics and mobility- to assist the relief effort.

In February, a EU team of experts from the Commission, France, Spain and the UK went on a fact finding mission in order to assess the most urgent needs and try to reorient the programming for quick impact projects and find the best ways to spend the additional money. The team made proposals for reconstruction of government buildings, support for education and governance, budget support and strengthening disaster preparedness mechanisms. Soon after, a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) exercise was launched in order to forge a national strategy for recovery and development, including the design of measurable targets, indicators and costs for the immediate (6 months), short-term (18 months) and medium to long-term (3 and 10 years respectively) perspective.²⁸

THE INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY (IFS)

In Haiti – both pre- and post-earthquake – the IfS has allowed the EU to engage in conflict prevention, capacity building, community violence reduction, early recovery, livelihood improvement as well as political dialogue.

The Instrument for Stability was created in 2007 in order to enhance the EU's capacity in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery after natural disasters. It reflects the need to increase the EU's flexibility to respond to fragile and conflict-affected countries given that the EU's existing long-term development assistance instruments were far too rigid in programming and administrative terms.²⁹ The instrument has a short- and a long-term component and a budgetary allocation of €2.06 billion (2007-2013). As a rapid, non-programmable tool, the IfS short-term or crisis response component introduced flexibility to engage in the fields of conflict prevention, post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery after natural disasters. Actions financed under the IfS are meant to contribute to reestablishing the conditions necessary to implement the EC's development assistance under the relevant long-term instruments. No annual programming is done for the IfS, and it can only be triggered in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis and projects have a maximum duration of 18 months.

²⁷ Giji Gya (2010). *Breaking the EU silos in CFSP – an organisational change professional needed*. Number 49, ISIS Europe.

²⁸ EU press release (2010). *Factsheet on response to Haiti earthquake*. Memo 10/113. March 20. Brussels.

²⁹ The IfS replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) created in 2001. The legal base for the IfS is Regulation (EC) No. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

POST-VIOLENCE REHABILITATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Before the earthquake and concretely in 2007/2008, €3 million from the IfS were assigned to Haiti to implement a project in the field of post-violence rehabilitation and conflict prevention. The project aimed at rehabilitating key infrastructure and public spaces in Martissant, a very densely populated and extremely poor neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince with over 300,000 inhabitants, improving livelihoods and enhancing job creation, especially for young people. The project had three components: urban planning – in particular the construction of a park in the heart of the neighbourhood; water and sanitation; and training and jobs.

Apart from the abject living conditions, the population of Martissant had been especially exposed to violence. Neither the Haitian state nor MINUSTAH were able to protect citizens from violence among different armed groups with varying political and criminal affiliations; a situation that culminated in the July 2006 massacre of 22 people. By 2007 and after several military security operations, MINUSTAH and the HNP had largely regained control of Martissant and other slums in Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless, from a human security perspective, people remained extremely vulnerable, insecure and isolated, and many are seriously traumatised by violence.

From an overall perspective the project can be described as a success. The local population was actively consulted over the design of the project and was involved in the implementation. Further added value lay in the fact the project did not privilege ex-gang leaders or members, but offered opportunities to those that had been victims of violence, who often feel frustrated because they receive relatively little attention from the international donor community.

CIVIL PROTECTION AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

The EU fact-finding mission in February 2010 identified the crucial need to strengthen Haitian government structures for civil protection. On the basis of this assessment, €14.5 million were made available through the IfS to reinforce state structures for civil protection and to enhance involvement of the Haitian population in the response to crises caused by natural disasters. The programme has several components and is being implemented jointly by the International Management Group (IMG),³⁰ CIVIPOL,³¹ a consulting service company employed by the French Ministry of the Interior in the fields of homeland security and civil protection, as well as the civil protection services of several EU member states.

One component refers to the setting up of a first response intervention mechanism at local level by creating rapid intervention modules, adapted to the specific local circumstances found in each of the approximately 400 proposed locations the programme covers. Each module comprises one or more secure stores containing first aid equipment adapted to the risks to which that particular area is exposed and a team of approximately ten persons, selected from local volunteers, specially trained to provide the first response to a crisis in the community. These modules combining teams and equipment, deployed on the ground at communal level, should constitute the backbone of a rapid reaction network to be activated following natural disasters. The system is modelled on similar structures existing in countries such as Japan and Turkey. Measures are rapidly visible and effective and contribute to reassuring the population.

Furthermore, a crisis room will be set up within the Directorate for Civil Protection (DPC) located at the Haitian Ministry of the Interior. This includes the installation of necessary equipment as well as the training of relevant DPC staff over 18 months. The objective of the crisis room is to give the National Civil Protection of Haiti a modern and high-tech national coordination centre that can be used for preparedness and coordination in the case of natural disasters or in support of general civil protection activities. The crisis room will be equipped with all the necessary hardware and software components needed in order to provide the coordination centre with a full and continuous situational awareness of emerging and ongoing crisis events, as well as to plan and coordinate

³⁰ See also: <http://www.img-int.org/Central/Public08/PublicNews.aspx?NewsID=03801894-680b-4689-9856-7e02e98a25d9>

³¹ See also: <http://www.civipol.net/www/home.php>

subsequent interventions. Communication with peripheral infrastructures will represent an important contribution to the project. Typical activities that could be assumed in the crisis room comprise situation monitoring, assessment and alerting (tropical cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis, extreme weather conditions), and command and control functions for civil protection ground forces (dispatching forces to disaster area, communication and situation updates, field reporting tools), along with data sharing and dissemination among stakeholders through an emergency web-based platform, bulletins and newsletters.

Moreover, the project aims to establish an operational intervention plan for civil protection mechanisms as well as a government communication strategy for situations of crisis and post-crisis. The former comprises the establishment of an inter-ministerial platform in charge of drawing up emergency response procedures, defining government crisis cells to be activated in case of natural disaster, etc. The latter includes support for the creation of a government structure responsible for production and management of information during crises, assistance to national communication campaigns regarding major risks, preventive measures to be taken by the population, campaigns for recruitment of volunteers, etc. The community platform for early warning 'Ushahidi'³² will be used as a tool to gather operational information from the ground for the use of civil protection services.

QUICK IMPACT ON LIVELIHOODS AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Accelerating the response to the pressing socio-economic needs of earthquake victims was identified as a crucial part of the early recovery and reconstruction effort. Through the IfS, €5 million was assigned to a cash for work programme implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).³³ The programme aims to support livelihoods of displaced populations by creating immediate employment opportunities in clearing rubble and rehabilitating essential social infrastructures, such as street repairs and electricity. It is a first step towards stabilising people's livelihoods and restarting the local economy, as well as promoting community-driven recovery.

Cash for work activities started a week after the earthquake and were designed in cooperation with the mayors of the affected areas. The government has also been involved in the implementation of programme activities, notably through the implication of the water and sanitation department within the Ministry of Public Works and through the involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture in overseeing the implementation of cash for work activities in areas outside Port-au-Prince.

Furthermore, IfS funds (€500,000) are being used to strengthen political dialogue in Haiti with the aim of increasing Haitian leadership and ownership of the recovery and reconstruction process. The project is being implemented by Club de Madrid,³⁴ an independent organisation dedicated to strengthening democratic values and leadership by drawing on the experience and resources of its members, more than 70 democratic former heads of state and government from 50 countries.

Club de Madrid has created a task force of high-level members³⁵ to work directly with Haiti's political leadership, the president, the prime minister and their cabinets over 18 months. The task force provides strategic advice and support in leading the consensus-building process needed to achieve a multi-stakeholder national agreement on key issues essential for Haiti's reconstruction. The agenda, which was agreed with Haiti's Prime Minister Bellerive at a meeting in Madrid in May 2010, comprises issues such as improved efficiency and effectiveness of international cooperation management and delivery, the Interim Commission for Haiti Reconstruction, constitutional reform, elections and political parties.

³² 'Ushahidi', which means 'testimony' in Swahili, was a website initially developed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election fallout at the beginning of 2008. The original site was used to map incidents of violence and peace efforts throughout the country based on reports submitted via the web and mobile phone. This resource had 45,000 users in Kenya. Since early 2008 it has grown from an ad hoc group of volunteers to a focused organisation. To learn more see: <http://www.usshahidi.com/>

³³ The programme is carried out in affected areas in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, Léogane and Crassier, where up to 90 per cent of buildings have been destroyed in some places, as well as Jacmel, Martissant, and other areas impacted directly and indirectly by the earthquake.

³⁴ See also: <http://www.clubmadrid.org/> and http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/global_leadership_for_haiti_reconstruction

³⁵ Lionel Jospin, former prime minister of France; Ricardo Lagos, former president of Chile; Chandrika Kumaratunga, former president of Sri Lanka; Jorge Fernando Quiroga, former president of Bolivia; Cassam Uteem, former president of the Republic of Mauritius; Juan Gabriel Valdés, former head of MINUSTAH.

In the light of the contested results of the November presidential and legislative elections, the greatest challenge for the successful implementation of this project is the current political instability and uncertainty over whether the future government will be interested in continuing with the project.

CONCLUSIONS

Haiti is trapped in a vicious circle between the country's progressive structural deterioration and recurrent emergencies. For the international community it is therefore imperative to address Haiti's short and the long-term needs, and to do so in an integrated way. The country's fragility and chronic instability require high degrees of flexibility from international donors.

The EU's policy framework increasingly reflects these challenges. In 2007 the EU launched the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in order to enhance its capacity in the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery after natural disasters. In Haiti – both pre- and post-earthquake – the IfS has allowed the EU to respond quickly and in flexible ways to needs on the ground. Actions financed through the IfS cover the fields of conflict prevention, capacity building, community violence reduction, early recovery, livelihood improvement as well as political dialogue. This is a positive development.

Moreover, the EU has complemented its role as a development and humanitarian actor in Haiti with increased engagement in the field of security. This has been pursued in an integrated fashion with regards to the other actors on the ground, in particular MINUSTAH, so as to avoid duplication of efforts and mission competition. The deployment of 300 police officers from the European Gendarmerie Force is a good example of this, as is the intention to assist MINUSTAH and Haitian institutions in the field of border management.

The impact and consequences of the earthquake compound the enormous political, economic, social, and security challenges Haiti already faced before the devastating event in January 2010. Prior to the disaster it was already clear that the structural transformation of the local political economy, including the crucial need for a feasible national strategy for socio-economic development and the political will and capacity to implement it, was the main challenge facing the country. The EU's efforts to work with the Haitian leadership towards a national consensus represents a useful approach. However, due to the ongoing controversy over the November elections, and the outbreak of violence around the country, international mediation might be required to find a solution for the continuing crisis in Haiti.

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