

IFP CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING CLUSTER
COUNTRY CASE STUDY: SPAIN

CROSS-SECTOR
PEACEBUILDING CAPACITIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Spain is a relatively new player in the international development cooperation system, as until the 1970s it was in fact a recipient of international assistance. Development cooperation has increased considerably since then, though in the context of the State's external action cooperation was not prioritised. However, over the last six years development cooperation has gained considerable prominence in Spain. Official funds allocated to cooperation have increased and in 2008 it is estimated that they will reach 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rising to 0.7 percent in 2012. The priority geographic area for assistance is still Latin America, although funds destined to less developed countries have increased, in particular to Africa. In addition, the institutions involved in defining and managing cooperation policies have been strengthened.

Spanish foreign policy has pledged to support an 'active, selective and strategic multilateralism',¹ and this commitment has led to the launching of the Alliance of Civilisations in association with Turkey. There has also been a significant increase in contributions to multilateral institutions (surpassing €2,200 million). Spain is currently ranked fourth among the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in terms of multilateral cooperation.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding were mentioned for the first time as strategic lines of Spanish cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation's (MAEC) *Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2005-2008*. In 2007, the *Peace Building Strategy Paper: Spanish Development Cooperation* was approved, thus transforming peacebuilding into one of the seven strategic lines of cooperation.² This strategy paper is now being disseminated among many sectors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities etc. The main activities that will be undertaken are in the process of being defined.

Civil society played an important role in drawing up the strategy paper, which embraces a peacebuilding approach that links security and development. Peacebuilding is considered to be an integral task before, during and after conflicts and should always entail a high degree of local ownership. The strategy proposes the use of essentially civilian means, although military resources shall also be considered if necessary to achieve peace.

Although the strategy is a new document, Spain already has a wide-ranging experience in promoting and supporting peace processes in countries such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo and Mozambique, among others. The type of instruments used range from peace missions with the UN, EU and NATO, to conventional diplomacy and the use of development aid to support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and post-conflict reconstruction processes. The strategy will allow Spain to systematically build on the past to enable action in the future.

While there have been major achievements, there is still a need for improvement, particularly in terms of strengthening strategy implementation. Moreover, for peacebuilding to become more effective it should permeate all areas of Spain's external action (trade, defence, immigration etc.) and much remains to be done in this area. On the other hand, Spain is not removed from the dominant trends in the international community and

1 J.L.R. Zapatero (2008). 'En interés de España: una política exterior comprometida' (In Spain's interest: A Committed Foreign Policy), An address by the Spanish Prime Minister at the Prado Museum (Madrid) on 16th June 2008 organised by Real Instituto Elcano (Elcano Royal Institute), with the collaboration of the following Spanish institutions: CIDOB Foundation, FRIDE, ICEI and INCIPE.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2007a). *Estrategia de Construcción de la Paz de la Cooperación Española para el Desarrollo (Peace Building Strategy Paper: Spanish Development Cooperation)*. Madrid, Spain: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Available at http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Cooperacion%20Internacional/Publicaciones%20y%20documentacin/Paginas/publicaciones_cooperacion.aspx (Spanish).

it continues to identify peacebuilding with post-conflict situations, which may justify the deployment of military resources on occasions. Integrating conflict analysis in the planning of cooperation with target countries should become a prerequisite.

A limited number of research centres and think tanks in Spain focus on the issue of development cooperation in the context of peacebuilding, human security and state fragility. In recent years, the government's dialogue with these political institutions has improved, although the capacity of these centres to influence policy-making is reduced owing to a corporatist, inward-looking political culture. Human and financial resources tend to be scarce, although progress has been made in diversifying sources of funding and interesting connections have been created between these research centres and the academic world.

However, other than sporadic initiatives, the same cannot be said for NGOs. Spanish NGOs are more focused on field work and less concerned with reflection and theoretical analysis. Their contribution is potentially very relevant, owing to their extensive experience in the field in terms of lessons learnt in peacebuilding. Furthermore, they have a noteworthy capacity to engage with public opinion. The members of the Network of Spanish Development NGOs (in Spanish CONGDE) achieved significant success when they convinced all the parliamentary groups to sign the State Pact Against Poverty, which contained a commitment to improve and increase Spanish development cooperation.

Generally speaking there is a high level of public support for international development cooperation, although there is little knowledge of the mechanisms and actors involved. Peacebuilding for the majority of the population is identified with overseas military deployment and this has contributed significantly to improving the public perception of the armed forces. A concerted discourse by a number of political actors has contributed to this identification, combined with a lack of clarity concerning the concept of peacebuilding, even among the principal aid donors.

Keywords: Spain, peacebuilding, human security, ODA.

ACRONYMS

AECID	Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation
CIDOB	Barcelona Centre for International Information and Documentation
CONGDE	Network of Spanish Development NGOs
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DGPOLDE	Directorate-General for Planning and Evaluation of Development Policies
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MAEC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

INTRODUCTION

The concept of peacebuilding gained ascendance after the Cold War, when the UN began to take part in new types of peace operations to provide support for countries in which conflict was coming to an end, in order to affect a transition towards sustainable peace. Complex new tasks had to be tackled and it was necessary to coordinate with a broad range of actors within the UN system, in addition to international financial institutions, regional organisations, NGOs, development agencies and local actors. Although the goals were ambitious, the results were not always satisfactory, and this raised the need for agencies and other bodies to address the task of defining the fundamental principles of what constitutes “peacebuilding”.

Notions of peacebuilding arose from a number of excessively broad definitions and there is little agreement on how to interpret it even today. Some consider peacebuilding to comprise all the tasks relating to state-building and good governance in societies that are in transition from conflict. Others limit the definition to technical aspects, such as disarming, demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants back into society. Yet others would interpret it as providing security to enable humanitarian assistance to be distributed and on that basis other long-term political, economic and social activities can be initiated. However, conflict prevention is implicit in the most broad-ranging definition of peacebuilding – that is to say, its purpose is to prevent a return to violence. Summing up, whether a broad or narrow definition is applied, peacebuilding comprises a number of tasks in the areas of security, institution strengthening and building, and public welfare with the aim of both stabilising the present situation and preventing further outbreaks of violent conflict in the future.

The concept of peacebuilding is closely linked to the concepts of “fragile” or “weak” states and human security. Over the last decade, most post-conflict situations have arisen in states whose institutions have been severely weakened or have collapsed due to conflict. At the same time, peacebuilding activities have explicitly or implicitly incorporated a wide-ranging concept of security, including conventional security factors, in addition to provision of health, food, adequate housing and human rights protection. There is an increasing consensus that peacebuilding as a long-term task can only be achieved by meeting the entire population’s human security needs.

Spain is a relatively new actor in the promotion of peacebuilding policies and has only recently incorporated the concept of human security in its foreign policy. Peacebuilding policies in Spain are linked to international development cooperation. Since 1975, when Spain embarked on the transition to democracy, the ever-increasing level of cooperation has been subordinated to foreign policy.

Because Spain itself received international assistance until recently, there was no peacebuilding tradition in the country. Spain therefore started taking part rather suddenly in peacebuilding and debate on cooperation. During the 1990s, NGOs and a number of academics and research centres began to reflect on the relationship between peace and development, and to become involved in the debates that were taking place in the UK and other countries. Political debate was fuelled by the movement in favour of donating 0.07 percent of GDP, Spanish participation in peace missions and strong social support for Latin America, the Palestinian cause and in developing countries in general. The state responded by increasing development assistance quotas, as did the regional governments, and from 2004 onwards Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased substantially. Strategy definition and the establishment of priorities became more effective and ODA was afforded greater political relevance.

Regarding the relationship between assistance and peacebuilding, the latter has in recent times come to be considered one of the seven strategic lines of action in Spanish cooperation policy.³ A strategy has been drawn up that aims to provide a framework for action and civil society has participated significantly in the elaboration of this strategy. This will hopefully enable all actions in this field to be systemised from now on. However, the discussion on peacebuilding in the future will depend on the capacities available in the country.

A limited number of research centres, think tanks and NGOs focus on this issue in Spain. Their activities and publications reflect the main international debates and concepts, although there is less activity associated with translating these debates into the reality of Spanish foreign policy. These social actors have limited access to and influence over decision-makers and public policy, although they have become somewhat more influential in recent years. Likewise, a scarcity of human and financial resources is evident, partly owing to excessive dependence on institutional funds and the fact that Spanish public authorities tend not to fund independent institutions. It is worth pointing out two interesting facts: firstly, a number of Spanish NGOs have become members of international organisations; second, a number of research institutions and organisations are becoming more experienced in raising funds for their projects in the EU and among private European and US foundations.

Spanish society in general broadly supports international cooperation, although there is a widespread lack of knowledge about its mechanisms, activities and players. Regarding the concept of peacebuilding, it is probably fair to state that all “peace” actions are associated with Spanish participation in peace missions, which have had a high level of continued public support (about 50 percent of the population) over the years, as evidenced by opinion polls.⁴ In fact, the government does not explain and disseminate information on its intention for Spain to become a significant international actor in peacebuilding and Spanish research institutes, think tanks and NGOs do not have the outreach capacity to achieve this.

This paper offers an overview of the situation in Spain concerning development cooperation and peacebuilding at governmental and non-governmental levels. We first analyse how foreign policy priorities have been defined since the transition to democracy in Spain and how the official development assistance system came into existence. We then analyse the creation and evolution of research centres, academic departments, NGOs and think tanks that deal with international issues, and look at how these institutions have changed over the last thirty years.

This study focuses on Spain’s priorities in foreign policy and the current relationship between development cooperation and peacebuilding. At the same time, it analyses the activities and strategic lines of the institutions and the principal NGOs that currently deal with these issues, in addition to the links and communication channels between the different actors. It also identifies the challenges in achieving more effective policies and building knowledge.

3 The other strategic lines of action are: increasing social and institutional capacities (Strategy of democratic governance, public participation and institutional development); increasing human capacities (Strategy of education, health and the fight against poverty); increasing economic capacities (Strategy of economic development); increasing capacities to improve environmental sustainability (Strategy of environmental development); increasing liberty and cultural capacities (Strategy of cooperation with indigenous peoples and culture); and increasing the capacities and autonomy of women (Strategy of gender and development). For more details, see www.maec.es.

4 Decimosexta Oleada del Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (Diciembre 2007) – Resumen de Prensa’ (Sixteenth wave Barometer of Real Instituto Elcano (December 2007) – Summary of Press), Real Instituto Elcano/Elcano Royal Institute, at <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/BarometroDelRIElcano>.

METHODOLOGY

In order to analyse the Spanish government's foreign policy orientation and its evolution, as well as the creation of the development cooperation system, the main official documents on foreign policy, peacebuilding and related themes from the MAEC, Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECID) have been consulted. Parliamentary speeches and public statements by relevant actors have also been studied, as well as legal documents and analysis of these documents by non-governmental sources. Regarding the latter, the information posted on websites and internal and external documents have been referred to. All documentation used has been complemented by interviews.

The interviewees selected were representatives from the official institutions involved in defining official policy (i.e. the MAEC and AECID) and members of the main NGOs involved in peacebuilding activities and from think tanks that tackle these issues. The leading national newspapers were also reviewed. (See Annexes 1 and 2 for a complete list of organisations interviewed and newspapers reviewed.)

SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT

During the early years of Spain's transition to democracy in the second half of the 1970s, domestic policy was accorded greater priority than foreign policy. The first measures taken after Francisco Franco's death were the normalisation of foreign relations and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with many countries. In 1977, Spain applied for European Common Market membership and the application was accepted when the Constitution was approved in 1978. Spain joined the Common Market in 1985 and its membership created a broad consensus in Spanish society.

Foreign policy at the time of this consensus reconciled pro-Europeans with those who were pro-US. However, those who favoured a position whereby Spain, while being a country of the North, would become a leader among countries of the South, were gradually sidelined. Membership of NATO and the debate over staying in it or not, was one of the great themes of debate in the 1980s, polarising society and political forces. For the first time, an international issue was widely debated at a national level.

Between 1986 and 2000, Spain maintained a foreign policy based on full membership of NATO and European security mechanisms, while maintaining a cordial and cooperative relationship with the US. Between 2000 and 2003, the rightwing Partido Popular entered political power and broke the pro-European consensus. Spain sided with Washington and declared war and sent troops to Iraq in 2003. Prime Minister José Maria Aznar also supported the US in its policies in Latin America, the Middle East and "global war on terror", in the case of the latter allowing American planes carrying detainees to prisons in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib to fly through Spanish airspace. These actions had very negative repercussions for Spain's international profile.⁵

International issues played a significant role in the Partido Popular's downfall in 2004. Participation in and support for the war in Iraq was opposed by 90 percent of the population and it was moreover linked to the attacks on 11th March 2004 in Madrid, which were perceived as a dire consequence of the Partido Popular's foreign policy decisions. The outcome was a change in government which led to an attempt to reinstate the consensus model of foreign policy.

CURRENT PRIORITIES

After pulling Spanish troops out of Iraq in 2004, one of the first decisions made by Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government was to return to a foreign policy based on multilateralism and the supremacy of international law. Within this framework, Spain committed itself to legitimising and strengthening the UN and together with Turkey launched the Alliance of Civilisations, an initiative intended to strengthen the links between Western and Islamic countries. As José Zapatero declared in a speech in Madrid in June 2008, 'I believe in a foreign policy of engagement. [...] I am convinced that a foreign policy thus conceived is the best way to defend our interests as a country, the interests of an intermediate power that occupies a unique strategic position in the current multipolar world'.⁶

5 Celestino del Arenal (2008). 'Entre la afirmación de la dimensión normativa y el reforzamiento del pragmatismo: la política exterior y de seguridad de España en 2007' (Between the affirmation of the normative dimension and the reinforcement of the pragmatism: the foreign and security policy of Spain in 2007) in *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2008* (2008). Barcelona, Spain: Center for International Relations and Development Studies. Available at http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/anuarios/anuario_internacional_cidob/anuario_internacional_cidob_2008 (Spanish); http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/yearbooks/cidob_international_yearbook/anuario_internacional_cidob_2008 (English); P. Yákovlev (2006). 'Cambios en la política exterior de España' (Changes in the foreign policy of Spain), Instituto de Latinoamérica de la Academia de Ciencias de Rusia (ILA ACR), at <http://www.ilaran.ru/?n=376>.

6 J.L.R. Zapatero (2008). Op. cit.

This turnabout meant a return to the EU's strategic priority. Current Spanish foreign policy considers the main political, economic and strategic interests to be aligned with the EU and that Spanish diplomacy's priorities should be defined by and with Europe. Thanks to Spain's staunch support of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process), the Union for the Mediterranean project launched by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in July 2008 has become an EU initiative. A slow normalisation of political and diplomatic relations with the US has also come about during this period.

Another priority has been a return to relations with the Mediterranean and maintaining a profile, albeit discreet, in the Middle East. Latin America has again become a strategic reference point for foreign action, which has resulted in more opportunities for direct political dialogue and a strengthening of Spanish presence in the region. Spain will hold the European Presidency in 2010 and Latin America will be a priority. Promoting a more active policy towards the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also important, according to Spanish Government sources.

The *Africa Plan 2006–2008* is a significant new initiative, as it reveals a will to move closer to a region that has traditionally been removed from Spanish interests.⁷ The plan is linked to the explicit Zapatero's Government policy that considers development aid as a tool to diminish the flow of illegal migration to Spain. The Plan also led to the setting up of fresh initiatives in Spain's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and the establishing of close relations with a number of countries that until now had not been considered a priority for Spain. One of the plan's central points is the strengthening of democracy, peace and security in these countries. Regarding Asia, the *Asia Plan 2005–2008* aims to achieve greater Spanish presence in the region.

Spanish foreign policy has now become more sensitive to complex approaches to global issues and changes. In the above-mentioned speech, Jose R. Zapatero declared that Spain was willing to act on the major challenges to international governability: the fight against poverty, peacebuilding, immigration, and climate change and energy.⁸

ODA IN SPAIN

Spain is a relatively new player in the international development cooperation system. In fact, until the late 1970s it was a recipient of international assistance. At present, it is ranked eighth among donors in terms of volume of aid and is a country that has increased its contributions in recent years, in contrast with the general downward trend.

From an extremely modest start, Spanish ODA underwent a significant increase in the late eighties and early nineties, reaching 0.28 percent of GDP in 1992. By the end of the decade, the percentages had dropped again to 0.23-0.24 percent. During the 1990s, the role of ODA was comparatively marginal in public policy, and it was regarded as a lesser policy within the government's overall external action, subordinate to other national and international political interests, which resulted in a decrease in donations.

As of 2004, José Zapatero's government pledged its commitment to move from 'a policy of cooperation to a policy of development' and to increase aid to 0.5 percent of GDP by 2008, and eventually to 0.7 percent by the end of its current term of office in 2012. In 2006, Spanish aid rose to €3,038 million, 0.32 of its GDP, with Spain thus ranking eighth in the list of donor countries.⁹ Latin America remained the main recipient of bilateral ODA, with 47 percent of the total, while the African share reached 34.1 percent.¹⁰ Forecasts for 2008 indicate that ODA will surpass €5,500 million, thus reaching the goal of 0.5 percent of GDP.

7 The Africa Plan, Asia Plan and other foreign policy documents can be consulted on the MAEC website at www.maec.es; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2006). *Plan África 2006-2008*. Madrid, Spain: Directorate General of Foreign Media. Available at <http://www.maec.es/es/Home/Paginas/planafrica.aspx>.

8 J.L.R. Zapatero (2008). Op. cit.

9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2007b). *Seguimiento del PACI 2006* (Monitoring the Annual Plan for International Cooperation 2006). Madrid, Spain: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Available at [http://www.maec.es/SiteCollectionDocuments/Cooperación española/Estadísticas/SEG PACI 2006.pdf](http://www.maec.es/SiteCollectionDocuments/Cooperación%20española/Estadísticas/SEG%20PACI%202006.pdf); *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2008* (2008). Op. cit.

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2007b). Op. cit. p.20.

Since 1977, the Spanish establishment has been seeking full legitimisation for Spain in the international arena, particularly within the network of institutions such as NATO, World Bank, the IMF and also the UN and its values. Values are important to Spanish society and the level of acceptance of development cooperation is very high. All governments, and particularly the socialist ones, need to respond to this value-oriented society. Moreover, Spain's economy surged from the early 1990s until last year, when the first signs of the global financial crisis began to appear. Spain was thus in a position to become a major contributor to the UN system and to increase its own cooperation.

Since 2004, there has been a shift in direction which accords greater importance to multilateral cooperation. This form of assistance has increased by 157 percent, totalling €2,229 million in 2007, making Spain the fourth-largest DAC donor in terms of multilateral cooperation. According to the government, this means that its multilateral cooperation policy is 'active, selective and strategic'.¹¹

The Spanish development aid system is complex and decentralised. Central government is the main player in the system and at least six ministries are involved in formulating and implementing cooperation policy. However, since 2004 the MAEC has provided most of the funds, channelling them through the AECID, which manages cooperation funds, particularly towards international organisations and NGOs.

Decentralisation is a distinctive feature of development assistance, reflecting the Spanish political structure. Regional autonomies and local bodies play an important role in the funding of development cooperation. This so-called decentralised cooperation has seen a ten-fold growth in its resources in recent years, exceeding €400 million in 2006 and it currently accounts for 15 percent of Spanish ODA. This quantitative increase has also been accompanied by a significant improvement in institutions, legislation, strategic planning and creation of agencies.¹² The high level of decentralisation requires highly effective coordination and AECID is the body responsible for coordinating operations.

The consultative organs that advise the government on cooperation are the Development Cooperation Council (comprising government, civil society and social agents), the International Commission (the Central Administration in conjunction with local communities and organisations), and the Inter-Ministerial Commission for International Cooperation (Central Administration Ministries and departments).

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2008). *Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2008*. Madrid, Spain: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Available at http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Cooperacion%20Internacional/Publicaciones%20y%20documentacin/Paginas/publicaciones_cooperacion.aspx. The new orientations have been positively appraised by the OECD-DAC in their most recent report on Spanish cooperation. See: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007). *Spain: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – Peer Review*. Paris, France: Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/14/39710206.pdf>.

12 The Coordinadora de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Desarrollo (CONGDE) gathers all the Spanish NGOs that adhere to a common code of conduct and the UN principles of development.

RESEARCH CENTRES, THINK TANKS AND NGOS

Academic work and research on peace and conflict is quite recent in Spain. The repressive and inward-looking Franco regime set severe constraints on social thought and debate, which hindered intellectual activity and also research into international issues. International relations and peace studies were frowned upon, as opposed to other countries where both disciplines were developed to some degree. Until the dictatorship ended, debate on defence, peace and security matters took place behind closed doors and beyond the public gaze.

However, during the 1970s and the 1980s, peace movements became more influential, partly owing to the controversy surrounding the referendum mentioned above on Spain's membership of NATO. The increase in conscientious objectors led to the abolition of the draft. The NATO debate was also linked to domestic issues such as modernisation of the armed forces.

Several academic and non-academic centres that are benchmarks today in Spain in these areas came into being during the 1980s, such as the Peace Research Seminar (SEIPAZ) and the Peace Research Centre (CIP). They soon began to work on armed conflict – particularly in Central America, human rights, development, poverty and disarmament. Latin America was the focus of attention, as well as the Mediterranean, particularly with regard to defence, strategy and security issues. When the first Gulf War broke out in 1991, the peace movement re-emerged after years of crisis brought about by its failure on the NATO issue.

From the 1980s onwards, the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of challenges posed by a new scenario characterised by an accelerating globalisation process, North-South relations and the outbreak of ethnically based conflicts. Cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, and the extremely high numbers of victims in these conflicts, opened the debate over how to manage these problems effectively and multilaterally. These issues were reflected in the work of the above-mentioned centres, which first broached these questions in Spain. Some of them still work in these areas, although only a few (as will be seen below) have actively begun to work on concepts such as peacebuilding and human security.

NGOS IN SPAIN

In the Franco period, there was no place for organisations that were not related to the Church or the political sphere. Thanks to the Church's independent position, organisations such as Caritas and (Intermón) Oxfam (created in 1942 and 1956 respectively) conducted charity work nationally and in some poor countries. Coinciding with the reform movement in the Catholic Church under Pope Paul VI, Medicus Mundi and Manos Unidas were founded in 1963 and 1969 respectively. During this period, Spain was removed from the transformations that were happening in other countries, where NGOs focussing on issues such as non-violence, human rights and development were being established.

During the early years of the transition, there were few activists involved in these issues, because priority was given to domestic problems relating to the consolidation of democracy. In the 1980s, Spain joined the EU and several mechanisms for giving grants were set up by the state and Europe, which helped to develop civil society organisations. The majority of Spanish NGOs were set up between 1986 and 1995 (57 percent of the total). Furthermore, during the 1980s political parties and trade unions created their own NGOs. There was widespread dissatisfaction and disillusion in the left-wing, owing to the crisis in the Communist Party, weakness in the left-wing parties outside the parliament and the policies implemented by the Socialist Party government. As a result,

many people who had been active in national politics joined and supported these new organisations, focussing on specific domestic issues such as ecology and gender, and international issues such as development, human rights and peace.

An illustrative example is Intermón, which was linked to the Jesuit missions in the sixties. With the arrival of democracy, Intermón's religious identity too changed, as it widened its membership and support base among secular citizens. Its membership grew and in the 1990s it began working with Oxfam International, finally becoming Intermón Oxfam, the largest NGO in Spain. Over one and a half million people regularly contribute to funding this NGO. About five hundred organisations are estimated to be involved in international cooperation, of which almost 100 – the most representative – are grouped under the umbrella of the Network of the Spanish Development NGOs (CONGDE),¹³ in addition to fourteen regional coordinators.

Apart from cooperation activities, NGOs promote public education on issues such as global poverty, human rights and fair trade. For example, in 2007 the members of CONGDE achieved significant success when they convinced all the parliamentary groups to sign a State Pact Against Poverty.¹⁴ This document contains commitments to transform cooperation policy into state policy, improve the resources available and the quality of this policy and achieve greater sensitisation of public opinion. Frequently, NGOs have been the only or main link between public opinion and the state's action on these issues, and as such they have a significant role to play in influencing cooperation policy.

A negative aspect of Spanish NGOs is that, in general, they do not have a tradition or practice of reflection and they produce little academic work on the conceptual issues associated with their work. With a few exceptions, they do not usually have links with or maintain working associations with think tanks and centres that research these issues.

¹³ The Coordinadora de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Desarrollo (CONGEDE) gathers all the Spanish NGOs that adhere to a common code of conduct and the UN principles of development.

¹⁴ The text of the State Pact Against Poverty is available at <http://www.congde.org/ant/documentos.htm>.

THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH: DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND PEACEBUILDING

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding were mentioned for the first time in the *Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2005-2008*. The aim of making Spain an 'active contributor to peacebuilding' was proposed as the hallmark of its foreign policy and international cooperation. The plan sets forth the need to go beyond the division between security and development policies: faced with new problems that have arisen since the nineties, existing security strategies have proven to be insufficient. They have said that peacebuilding needs to be tackled in terms of the interrelation, between the agenda for peace and security, and the agenda for development.¹⁵

A new step in this direction was the approval in 2007 of the *Peace Building Strategy Paper*, which seeks to integrate peacebuilding as one of the seven strategic lines of Spanish development cooperation. The strategy establishes the link between development and security as interrelated aspects and highlights that 'development is the first line of defence in building a collective security system that seriously addresses the prevention of violent conflict'.¹⁶ From this point of view, security is a precondition for social, political and economic development, but at the same time, global development of people and societies is a requisite for security.

Some key elements of the peacebuilding strategy are:

- A definition of peacebuilding: 'The combined actions that enable a society to prevent, manage and resolve a conflict – by means of its own capacities – without resorting to the use of violence. It is a process in which the individuals within society – as well as society as a whole – strengthen their capacity to create security and sustainable development through ongoing structural improvement of the basic mechanisms in the social, economic and political spheres'.
- Peacebuilding comprises three aspects that mutually reinforce each other and which should be simultaneously promoted:
 - *Security and defence*: DDR; security sector reform (SSR); humanitarian demining; small arms and light weapons control;
 - *Social and economic development*: repatriation and reinsertion of refugees and displaced persons; attention to victims, in particular women and children; reconstruction of basic infrastructure; health and education; private sector development; and
 - *Political development*: support for institutional and administrative consolidation; strengthening judicial systems; promoting civil society, democratic governability, respect for human rights and training in mediation and conflict resolution; development of early warning systems; promotion of reconciliation mechanisms.
- Peacebuilding includes conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. A variety of mainly civilian instruments are required, although military resources are also needed on occasions, in addition to a long-term commitment and vision.

¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2005). *Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2005-2008*. Madrid, Spain: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Available at www.aecid.es/03coop/6public_docs/2seci/2doc_coop_esp/ftp/Plan_Director_Ing.pdf.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2007a). Op. cit.

- Peacebuilding can only be successful if it is carried out inclusively, integrating the efforts of public and private, national and international actors; and it should be sustainable, combining the actions required before, during and after a violent incident.
- It is fundamentally a local activity: the promotion of human security corresponds to local actors, while international “peacebuilders” have a complementary role.
- Best results are obtained when peacebuilding is appropriately combined with other foreign priorities, such as human rights, gender diversity, environmental sustainability, respect for cultural diversity and the fight against poverty.

Human security has only begun to appear quite recently in Spanish cooperation documents. In both the master plan and the strategy, it is conceived in broad terms as a concept that comprises: ‘the security of people, their physical integrity, their social and economic welfare, respect for their dignity and value as human beings, as well as protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms’. However, the concept does not appear in the National Defence Law nor in the Directive on National Defence, which still focus on a paradigm of international security.¹⁷

Fragile states are the object of a great deal of development cooperation and peacebuilding efforts, yet no official reference documents refer to them nor are there lists identifying them. Neither are there departments within the government structure that specifically deal with this issue. The concept of fragile states is mentioned in the strategy as ‘States that have lost the monopoly on the use of force within their territory, that do not guarantee the security of their citizens, nor provide them with fundamental public services that would enable them to meet their basic needs and finally, do not exercise their authority effectively in all areas of the country’. José Zapatero’s speech outlined the guiding principles of Spain’s foreign policy, underscoring the need for ‘a vigilant and active international community in the face of weak states that can scarcely exercise a minimum control over their territories’.¹⁸

Neither reference accurately reveals which security concept should be applied when dealing with fragile states: the security of citizens and ensuring their basic needs, or international security in the traditional sense which sees these states as sources of instability toward the exterior. The approach to this issue is framed within the more wide-ranging goal of international peace and security and within the generic call for ‘effective multilateralism’. Spain will thus likely support UN and EU positions on this issue and follow the consensus approach, rather than proactively contributing to being one of the key actors when adopting definitions. Spain’s future policy will depend greatly on the evolution in doctrine and practice that takes place in these two bodies.¹⁹

GENDER AND PEACE POLICIES

The gender issue has been incorporated into Spanish development cooperation, as it is one of the seven sectoral lines and both the master plan and the annual plans allocate specific funds for this area.²⁰ As with peacebuilding, the Spanish government has also adopted a strategy for Gender in Development, which aims to incorporate gender as a priority aspect of development cooperation policies. The strategy is based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination and it assumes the concept of ‘gender in development’. Civil society organisations, NGOs, academics and relevant institutions took part in drawing up the strategy paper, which is aimed at all the Spanish cooperation actors that will be involved in incorporating gender in their actions. The government is making a concerted effort to disseminate this strategy among the international organisations it is a member of.

¹⁷ Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence, published in the Spanish Official Gazette No. 276, 18th November 2005; National Defence Directive 1/2004, 30th November 2004.

¹⁸ J.L.R. Zapatero (2008). *Op. cit.*

¹⁹ This is the opinion of the authors of this paper based on Spain’s track record and its relative influence in these institutions. Several of the interviewees also expressed this opinion. (See Annex I for the list of interviewees.)

²⁰ See footnote 2.

In addition to allocating the corresponding funds, the 2008 annual plan underscores the need to promote the application of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the role of women in peace and security. Spain has an Action Plan for the application of Resolution 1325 and a large number of ministries took part in its elaboration (MAEC, MoD, Labour and Social Affairs, Interior, Justice, Education and Science, Health and Consumer Affairs), together with representatives of civil society. The plan aims to: encourage the participation of women in peace missions and in decision-making; promote the inclusion of the gender perspective in all peacebuilding activities; ensure equal rights training of personnel who take part in missions; protect women and girls' rights in conflict and post-conflict areas; promote the participation of women in peace negotiations and agreements; incorporate the principle of equality in DDR operations and personnel training; and promote the participation of Spanish civil society in all these processes. Moreover, Spain pledges to promote all these activities in the international institutions of which it is a member.

THE ROAD MAP TO IMPLEMENTATION

A very positive aspect of the peacebuilding strategy is that civil society participated to a large degree in its preparation. The Directorate-General for Planning and Evaluation of Development Policies (DGPOLDE), the body responsible for defining and planning these policies, commissioned the initial text from the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH), a civil society research centre. The draft was sent for consultation to other centres, universities, think tanks and relevant government institutions. Finally, the contents were debated at a joint seminar in 2007, during which the government introduced a number of modifications and it was then approved.²¹

The strategy is currently being implemented and the different government institutions involved are defining the measures to be taken. The DGPOLDE is disseminating its content through meetings, seminars, workshops etc., in which civil society institutions and universities are taking part. The DGPOLDE is very active in broadcasting the Spanish position through its field offices and in international organisations. In addition, action plans are being drawn up on humanitarian demining (an area in which Spain has a lengthy experience) and on women and peacebuilding. Spain is working within the DAC framework in Colombia and on SSR in Bolivia.

AECID is in the process of reforming its organisational structure in order to better adapt to the changes in the aid system and to facilitate collaboration with other ministries (including MAEC, Economy and Finance, Interior) and the Presidency. Similar reform is taking place in other countries also seeking a "whole-of-government approach".

AECID has raised the profile of humanitarian action by creating a Humanitarian Action Office consisting of an Emergency and Post-Conflict Department and a Prevention and Evaluation Unit. Funding for peacebuilding actions will be coordinated through this new department. Although the Directorate-Generals for the geographic areas will also have a role to play in funding, it is hoped that the relevant information will be systemised. As part of the effort to strengthen development cooperation in recent years, AECID's budget has been tripled, reaching a total of €900 million.²²

In the area of peacebuilding, the DGPOLDE and AECID collaborate with the Special Mission Ambassador for Peace Operations (a horizontal unit within MAEC). Despite its title, this department's work is not limited to post-conflict peace operations, but through Spain's embassies it undertakes an ongoing monitoring of possible conflict indicators in order to initiate a rapid reaction. This could take place through political mechanisms (negotiation, accompanying, facilitating bilateral, regional and global talks) and also through collaborating with institutions responsible for cooperation, in order to set up rapid programmes tackling human rights, the justice system etc. This unit also promotes civilian cooperation in post-conflict situations (with the participation of members of the Civil Guard and the National Police, judges, prosecutors etc.).

²¹ Representatives of government institutions, research centres, NGOs and academic centres that had been consulted previously took part in the seminar.

²² Press Release of the President's Office, October 27th, 2007, available at <http://www.la-moncloa.es/ActualidadHome/261007-Consejo.htm>

ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE

Although the strategy is a new document, Spain has accumulated a wide-ranging experience in promoting and supporting peace processes in countries such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo and Mozambique, among others. The type of instrument used has been peace missions with the UN, EU and NATO, conventional diplomacy, and the use of development aid to support DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes.

For example, several programmes have been supported through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), including peacebuilding and development of areas affected by armed conflict in the south Philippines and territorial development for coexistence in three regions of Colombia. In 2006, Spain doubled its contribution to UNDP, reaching €15 million, and a UNDP-Spain fund for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been created.²³ Within the framework of this fund, a new line in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been opened. The fund aims to reduce the risk of an outbreak or reoccurrence of violent conflict by strengthening institutions and local and national capacities in the chosen countries that can develop effective peacebuilding programmes. In collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Spain has provided support for the repatriation and integration of refugees in the south of Sudan, repatriation and integration in Badghis province, Afghanistan and intervention in small and medium-sized cities in Colombia, among other tasks. Other programmes are being developed using Spanish and foreign NGO funding.

In addition to the actions defined as 'conflict prevention and peacebuilding', under the title of 'democratic governance, citizen participation and institutional development', support has been given to the holding of elections in Afghanistan, promoting the media in Iraq and strengthening the capacities of the Inter-American Human Rights Court. In addition, technical electoral assistance has been provided in Haiti and support for governability in Central America, not forgetting the actions of other departments within AECID.

In 2006, the contribution under the heading 'conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security' totalled almost €18 million, while funds allocated to 'government and civil society' surpassed €131 million.²⁴

To summarise, Spain is striving to become more active in peacebuilding internationally. The relevant institutions are being reformed and this issue has become more important politically, with more resources earmarked toward it.²⁵ A strategy has been prepared with civil society participation, which, together with Spain's accumulated experience in peacebuilding, provides a solid starting point. However, certain points need to be more clearly defined, such as priorities (geographical, sectoral etc.), the resources to be allocated and how the results will be assessed etc.

Given the large number of institutions involved, a concerted effort is being made to improve coordination. There is reason to believe that the decentralisation of development assistance in Spain has fragmented cooperation policies, and that coherence and coordination need to be improved. However, the regional autonomies also provide valuable contributions to the aid system through their development aid programmes.

Spain specifically includes conflict prevention and peacebuilding in its strategy documents for those priority and special-attention countries in conflict, post-conflict or fragile situations (e.g. Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Philippines), and earmarks funds for these purposes. Specific actions are established, such as SSR, DDR, strengthening of judicial institutions etc. Haiti is one such priority country. There, Spain collaborates in police, correctional and judicial reform programmes. A coherent relationship between development, peace and security is therefore evident in the country strategies.

²³ For further information about the fund, see: www.undp.org/spain.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (2007a). *Op. cit.* p.159.

²⁵ While not falling within this report's scope, it is worth mentioning that over the last 20 years, Spain has participated in UN, EU and NATO peace missions. It has taken part in over 50 missions deploying 100,000 soldiers and this has enabled Spain to accumulate significant experience in areas such as DDR, SSR, humanitarian aid and other aspects of peace operations. Currently Spain is deploying 3,000 soldiers abroad: 380 are involved in EU operations (over 360 in European Union Force (EUFOR)-Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina); 1,405 in NATO missions (Kosovo Force (KFOR) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan); and almost 1,200 in UN missions, most in the United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It also maintains a small contingent in Chad and the Central African Republic.

THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL SPHERE: A LIMITED SCOPE

The number of research centres, academic departments and think tanks that address issues of development cooperation, peacebuilding and security is limited. In general, their activity reflects the debates and concepts of international centres and agencies, but their capacity to influence public policy, the media or public opinion is difficult to gauge. Both their financial and human resources are limited and, although there has been some improvement over the past six years, it has not been sufficient.

THE OVERALL SITUATION OF SPANISH RESEARCH INSTITUTES

In general, research centres face difficulties related to financial and structural weaknesses due, in part, to a lack of political will to support this type of independent activity. Although the situation has improved in recent years, greater support has been received from institutions at the regional autonomy or municipal level, in addition to universities and some foundations.

During recent years there has been a significant increase in research on peace studies, international relations and development cooperation by research institutions, think tanks, postgraduate courses etc. However, not many institutions are tackling specific issues (e.g. the relationship between development cooperation and peacebuilding), though there has been an increase in publications and seminars, and certain research centres, think tanks and universities are trying to foster/encourage this debate. In recent years, lobbying of the government to define the agenda and influence policy-making has become more effective.

Tenders for development cooperation projects do not generally take into account budget lines for research projects, which affects the larger NGOs wishing to undertake this type of activity. It is also difficult to generate support from private business for issues concerning peace, though support for the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid suggests that there is a growing interest in supporting activities related to foreign policy and security. Some foundations linked to commercial or savings banks (e.g. La Caixa and Bancaja) also support dissemination campaigns and fieldwork. Yet, such a general insecurity in support creates uncertainty about the continuity of both projects and staff. Financial constraints also make long-term projects and coordination between centres difficult, reducing projects to isolated initiatives and leading to intermittent communication between researchers.

On the one hand, this situation is related to the scarce attention paid to research on social and political issues in Spain. On the other hand, it is related to the fact that part of the research that is – or could be – carried out by centres focused on peace and security issues is not strictly academic, but rather aimed more at influencing government policy. This makes finding support even more difficult, as these institutes must highlight the importance of funding research activity and active fieldwork that is on the interface between academic research and NGO work. At the EU level, this is further exacerbated by bureaucratic obstacles that make access to funding impossible unless specialised personnel present undertake and defend a project. In short, these problems highlight an excessive dependence on public funds and the difficulties involved in accessing EU funds.

Consequently, centres are challenged to diversify their funding sources and to achieve a balance between their priorities and the interests of potential donors. They also need to develop innovative proposals that are both in line with the objectives of the centre and capture the interest of donors. Another more specific problem is the

difficulty of combining research and academic knowledge with political and governmental demands. In Spain, public authorities normally fund institutions that support their policies, and a tradition of intellectual and political independence remains to be instilled. One of the greatest challenges is the need for centres to develop a proper balance between maintaining close relationships based on trust, while preserving their own independent principles and criteria in politically compromising situations.

A middle ground of research and training has evolved between the academic and non-governmental spheres. Noteworthy in this respect is the relationship between research centres/think tanks and prominent figures from the academic world active in this field. University academics publish their work in the journals of these centres and even occasionally coordinate these publications. Likewise, members from the centres are involved in teaching activities at universities, especially postgraduate courses. There are other cases where the symbiosis is even clearer. For example, the School for a Culture of Peace is located within the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

Another aspect that is quite characteristic of Spain is the establishment and consolidation of centres operating in the autonomous regions. These institutes may or may not maintain close links with the regional authorities, but they no doubt exert a strong influence over them. Its rise reflects a growing interest on the part of local and regional authorities, along with civil society, to become more prominent in a non-centralist foreign policy through international cooperation, humanitarian action and culture.

NGOS AND PEACEBUILDING

There are currently approximately 3,000 NGOs in Spain at state, regional (autonomous) and local government levels. This figure includes organisations that carry out social, integration, educational work and other diverse activities. Of these, over 200 work in development, disaster relief and human rights. Many of them work on development issues and humanitarian action, and this leads them to approach or become directly active in peace and security matters, with a broad concept of security underpinning their work.

Generally speaking, these Spanish NGOs do not have a specific knowledge of peacebuilding. However, some are involved in implementing related practical activities in their development projects. In some cases, this work has its origins in the 1980s and 1990s, when many centres participated in projects in Central American countries afflicted by armed conflict or in post-conflict situations. At that time, projects were organised by Spain to support civil society and DDR, in addition to strengthening human rights systems. In this report, only those NGOs that specifically work in this area and contributed to the preparation of the government's *Peace Building Strategy Paper* are referred to.²⁶

Among the organisations that can be cited is Intermón Oxfam. Although it does not explicitly include peacebuilding in its programmes, the organisation does adopt some of the guidelines set by Oxfam International, and it carries out projects and campaigns that contribute to the knowledge and debate on peacebuilding – and in particular, human security. In 2008, Intermón Oxfam began to develop the concept of *Responsibility to Protect* from a humanitarian perspective.²⁷ Another organisation is Action Against Hunger/Acción contra el Hambre, which integrates trust-building and gender as cross-cutting issues when defining its projects in conflict and post-conflict situations, not as a basic objective, but as an integrated component in its technical projects and as an aspect of reinforcement.²⁸

ACSUR Las Segovias is one of the organisations that worked specifically in peacebuilding in Central America in the 1990s and the Mediterranean from 2000 (especially in Palestine and Western Sahara). It currently heads a consortium of six Spanish organisations and 15 Palestinian and Israeli organisations on the Middle East peace process. Its work is based on the premise of respect for international (humanitarian) law and human rights as non-negotiable fundamentals.²⁹ Another organisation that is active in this area is the Assembly of Cooperation for Peace (ACPP).³⁰

26 Except for two cases in which the organisation's directors decided not to participate in this study.

27 See: information and reports in www.intermonoxfam.org

28 For more information, see: <http://www.accioncontraelhambre.org/alai.php?p=1>.

29 For more information, see: <http://www.acsur.org/>.

30 For more information, see: <http://www.acpp.com/english/index.htm>.

POSITIONS ON GOVERNMENT POLICY

Many of these centres and NGOs participated in one way or another over the last two years in drawing up the peacebuilding strategy. In the case of the NGOs, a significant number carry out projects financed by AECID, thereby contributing to a certain extent toward achieving goals set by the government.

The new phase of Spanish cooperation entered in 2004, increased funding specifically earmarked for cooperation and greater significance accorded to this issue are all viewed positively in non-governmental circles. The strategy paper has also been received positively because it marks an innovative step, whereas previously there was no official position on peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are some fears regarding its genesis and implementation. Some of the main doubts expressed are as follows:

- It is a fairly progressive document but it will now actually have to be put into practice, that is to say, the programmes undertaken in the coming years will enable the practical application of the strategy and its effectiveness and outcomes to be assessed.
- This strategy only affects development cooperation and not other areas of the State's foreign action (defence, trade, immigration policies etc.), meaning that its impact will in any case be limited. It would be necessary to make more progress in the field of policy coherence.
- The strategy is a framework for action, but not a substantive development of policies. It does not address action, budget and anticipated results or give any indication as to how it will be evaluated.
- Certain critics point out that the definition of "peacebuilding" established in the strategy is still quite narrow and that it would be necessary to broaden it to include aspects such as conflict prevention, participation in peace processes, the absolute primacy of human rights or the concept of transitional justice.
- In general, there is a gap between theory and practice. The government maintains a dialogue sensitive to global problems and changes, but activities on the ground are less relevant than the dialogue. The *Africa Plan* has been the subject of much criticism, it being argued that its ultimate objective is the reversal of the tide of emigration rather than the development *per se* of the African continent.
- It is necessary to rigorously assess the role that Spanish cooperation has played to date in peacebuilding, such as in the conflicts in Palestine or the Sahara.

Generally speaking, NGOs are highly dependent on the central and regional governments. Many of them rely to a large extent on public funds and this limits their autonomy and critical capacity, yet at the same time these organisations contribute to implementing the government's policies by means of those funds. Although relations can be tense on occasions, for the most part the relationship is less critical today than it was two decades ago. In recent years, a common agenda on development and peace has begun to be defined.

OTHER ACTORS: PUBLIC OPINION, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MEDIA

Spanish opinion polls show a consistently high level of support among the public for international development cooperation. This was the opinion voiced by 84 percent of its citizens in 2005.³¹ However, there is a wide gap between this support and the deep lack of knowledge that generally exists both about this policy and development issues. Although there are few studies – and of a very limited nature – about how these questions are perceived, the Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute in 2005 showed that 90 percent of citizens say that they do not know what the aims and objectives of the MDGs are.³²

As far as peacebuilding is concerned, both governmental and non-governmental sectors point out that there is a vacuum not only in public opinion but also in the media, even amongst those that are specialised or most closely involved in the field. Peacebuilding tends to be identified with peacekeeping operations or with actions undertaken once the conflict is over. This confusion may stem from the lack of clarity with which even official authorities and organisations specialising in the subject approach the concepts. Moreover, peace missions benefit from a level of visibility that has garnered great popularity among the general public: between 1997 and 2007, the support for committing troops to these missions remained stable at 85 percent.³³

The gap in understanding on cooperation issues reveals the lack of clear policies aimed at sensitising, educating, and involving society at large, as well as the scarcity of means available to carry out these objectives. On the other hand, until now the government has allowed decision-making in cooperation matters to be carried out in a sphere largely removed from public scrutiny, leaving key decisions very much to the discretion of executive power, and, within the latter, to a comparatively small number of actors and managers. This democratic deficit is still largely apparent.

The media has played a significant role in the public acceptance of official and non-governmental peace policies and development aid. In addition, participation in peace operations has also been noteworthy since the 1980s and the media has been very supportive. Of the mainstream media, *El País* was the leading newspaper both during the transitional period to democracy and afterwards. It promoted these issues, endorsing Spain's participation in peacekeeping and development activities, and encouraging citizen involvement in NGOs. As such, *El País* was in the vanguard and in due course other daily newspapers followed. There are several reasons for this affinity with peace policies and the NGO sphere.

On the one hand, participation in peace operations and the adoption of peace perspectives by the military establishment was a common strategy. Part of the peace agenda and its narrative has been and still is a way for the military establishment to show its commitment to the democratic regime, and to cleanse its past after the

31 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (September 2005). Barómetro, No. 2617. Available at http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_barometros/depositados.jsp.

32 Some interesting facts are available in G. Angulo (2007). *Opinión pública, participación ciudadana y política de cooperación en España* (Public opinion, citizen participation and cooperation policy in Spain). Madrid, Spain: Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales. Available at www.ucm.es/info/icei/pdf/WP%2003-07.pdf.

33 J. Noya (November 2007). 'La opinión pública española y las misiones de las fuerzas armadas en el exterior' (Spanish public opinion and the missions of the armed forces abroad), ARI No. 121, at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_es/Zonas_es/Imagen+de+Espana/ARI+121-2007; 'Decimosexta Oleada del Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (Junio 2008) – Resumen de Prensa' (Nineteenth wave Barometer of Real Instituto Elcano (June 2008) – Summary of Press), Real Instituto Elcano/Elcano Royal Institute, at <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/BarometroDelRIElcano>.

Spanish Civil War and the subsequent repression. On the other hand, assuming the peace agenda since 1977 has been a way for the political parties and governments to show their engagement with the prevailing values of a society that does not want to participate in wars, that does not want to live through another civil war and that had – and to some extent still has – a certain reserve toward the military forces. As a matter of fact, there is very low level of volunteer participation in the armed forces and increasingly it is Latin American citizens that are joining the ranks of the Spanish armed forces.³⁴

At the same time, the crisis of the political parties and the massive emigration of citizens to non-political activities was implicitly seen by the major political parties, both left and rightwing, as the price to pay in order to affect a peaceful 'transition without rupture'. The political leaders who orchestrated the transition in the 1970s and early 1980s viewed with relief the fact that thousands of former leftwing militants left their parties to join NGOs, a non-political world of values and specific issues that contrasted with the vision of "revolution". The democratic media played a crucial role in promoting the value-oriented NGO world and the peace agenda implemented mainly by the government and armed forces. The modern democratic media reflects these trends, portraying the modern soldier and the citizen committed to values as two sides of the same coin.

Within the political parties there is a clear consensus on the importance of increasing and improving development cooperation, even in the current context of economic crisis.³⁵ Although there is concern about matters such as an appropriate definition of strategic policy in multilateral organisations or about how to increase the coherence and effectiveness of aid,³⁶ in general the parties show clear support for this policy. They participate principally through the Commission for Development Cooperation of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies which, starting this term, is not only a consultative body but also has legislative powers. The Spanish Senate has also established a Cooperation Commission where issues regarding development cooperation can be discussed and framed.

³⁴ In 2007 the Spanish armed forces had 76,200 and 3,275 of them were from 17 different Latin American countries. Source: Loquo Forum Debate, available at <http://foro.loquo.com/viewtopic.php?p=974132>

³⁵ Speech given by Secretary of State for International Cooperation Leire Pajin before the Cooperation Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, 11th June 2008. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, No. 40.

³⁶ The ways to increase the coherence and effectiveness of Spanish development cooperation have long been discussed by Spanish political parties. The issue of most concern is how to improve the coordination of the myriad of actors involved.

CONCLUSIONS

ODA has gathered notable momentum since 2004 in Spain, with an increase in earmarked funding, more support for priority geographical areas, including greater focus on Africa and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), greater clarity in defining strategies and objectives, and significant support for the institutions involved.

A peacebuilding strategy was approved in 2007 which, according to official sources, aims to be one of the fundamental axes of cooperation and will eventually influence other spheres of Spain's overseas activity. It was drawn up by means of a participative process, a new departure in the Spanish experience, in which not only the relevant government agencies participated, but also civil society (research centres, universities, NGOs). This strategy adopts a peacebuilding focus linking security with development. It considers peacebuilding to be an integral task to be carried out before, during and after conflicts, with high levels of local ownership and combined use of mainly civilian, but also military means. The strategy is now being disseminated throughout different sectors, particularly the actors in cooperation, universities, NGOs, international organisations etc. In addition, those activities that will fall within its framework are starting to be defined.

This is an important step, although a negative aspect is that it only affects cooperation policy and not all spheres of the state's overseas action, such as foreign policy or defence, not to mention trade or immigration policies. This stands in direct contrast to the declared aim of Spain becoming an "active peacebuilder", something that would require a "whole-of-government" approach. Although there have been structural changes and a strengthening of the capacities of institutions and cooperation organisations, no specific unit has been created dedicated to peacebuilding. Rather, it has been included in the Humanitarian Action Unit of AECID and more specifically in the section dealing with Emergencies and Post-Conflict.

The identification of peacebuilding with post-conflict situations reveals that Spain has not managed to escape the prevailing tendency in the rest of the international community, focusing too greatly on the actions that take place in the most acute phase of a crisis or conflict. On many occasions this leads to the deployment of peacekeeping operations. These may be necessary, although the use of military means implicitly acknowledges the failure of peacebuilding (which by definition should be a civilian task). If peacebuilding is to take a holistic approach, this would involve incorporating the analysis of factors relating to the conflict when planning cooperation with each country.

Spain favours peacebuilding through multilateral institutions and has significantly increased its contribution to these, especially to the UN. It is also participating on a larger scale in debate relating to peacebuilding in organisations such as OECD-DAC. All of this is positive, although Spain does not yet seem to be in a position to take the lead in these subjects, nor does it form part of the main international groups and networks. The government has also been criticised because its increase in funding for multilateral organisations has not been accompanied by greater influence in the defining of priorities and objectives. The concept of human security, for instance, has only appeared recently in documents, laws and speeches dealing with foreign policy and, although it is becoming more frequent, it appears to be specifically confined to cooperation. For example, the National Defence Law and the Directive on National Defence are still based on the paradigm of state security.

As far as fragile states are concerned, there is no specific doctrine, although the question of "states in a fragile situation" will be broached in the *Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2009–2012*. However, it should be noted that in Spanish cooperation policy there is geographical classification of countries in receipt of aid. They are ranked as priority countries, countries requiring special attention and preferential countries, totalling 57 in all. Fragile states are not identified, but in practice, the list includes a fair proportion of countries in crisis, to a greater

or lesser extent. Amongst the top priorities, for example, are Angola, Algeria, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Palestinian territories, Philippines and Western Sahara. Those receiving special attention (a situation defined by the existence of a crisis with a greater or lesser degree of violence) include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan, among others. In these countries, matters such as institution-strengthening, the promotion of civil society and respect for human rights, and issues directly related to violence, such as DDR, are already being worked on.

Despite the fact that there is a desire to grant greater significance and a central position in Spanish external action to development cooperation and peacebuilding, a great deal remains to be done. Part of this can be explained by the fact that there has not been enough time to get the strategy underway. Moreover, wide-ranging changes have been undertaken and the necessary structure has not been in place to implement them. It appears that these capacities are now being created.

The number of research centres, think tanks and NGOs dealing with peacebuilding, human security, fragile states etc., is very limited, as is their capacity to influence public policy. Although the level of dialogue has increased in recent years, those responsible for decision-making have maintained a certain degree of imperviousness, probably as a result of the inward-looking and corporatist political culture. An important challenge is to achieve a balance between maintaining close relationships based on trust, while preserving independent principles and viewpoints. In general, research centres and think tanks suffer from a lack of funding and resources, and it is difficult for them to obtain funding to finance research projects, thus creating difficulties – particularly for long-term projects and for coordination initiatives.

There are interesting connections between the academic sphere and research centres. Yet there are not as many links between them and NGOs, which in general undertake campaigns but are not deeply involved in theoretical debate on these topics. NGOs in Spain have not been traditionally involved in reflection and theoretical analysis, and are more experienced in practical work on the ground. Their contribution, nonetheless, could be very important in terms of lessons learnt and systematising experiences. Moreover, they usually have a noteworthy capacity to relate to public opinion.

As far as public opinion is concerned, there is consistent support for – although little knowledge of – development cooperation. Peacebuilding is overwhelmingly identified with peace missions – the result, at least in part, of a deliberate policy of identifying military deployment with peacebuilding, which in turn has increased the popularity of the armed forces. It would be necessary to initiate an ambitious public communication and sensitising strategy in order to increase knowledge on these issues, which to date has not been undertaken.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU

- It is vital to understand that peacebuilding is an ongoing, ambitious task that goes far beyond development cooperation and which can only be carried out as a long-term commitment. Moreover, if it is to be truly effective, local actors must play the key role. International organisations should provide support to local actors.
- Drawing up a document setting out the position regarding peacebuilding is important and even more so if it assumes the participation of civil society. This could provide a frame of reference in which actions already carried out in this area could be placed, along with those envisaged in the future. However, it would be important to improve policy coherence so that peacebuilding is not only regarded as an area specific to cooperation. To be effective, it should affect all areas of external action, including policies on defence, trade, immigration etc.
- It is very important to clarify the meaning of concepts like peacebuilding, since there is still significant confusion even among the principal donors (and the EU) over what constitutes “peacebuilding” and about the practical connections between cooperation, ODA and peace. This lack of clarity makes the practical work more challenging.
- In order to implement tasks aimed at peacebuilding, it is very important for personnel to have the appropriate conceptual training and methodology. This applies to personnel in overseas cooperation, embassy staff, NGO members and workers etc. Targeted training programmes are necessary.
- It is necessary to have active academics, innovative think tanks and NGOs involved in reflective work and capable of combining analysis of national situations with international debate. The EU could be crucial in financing the creation and activities of these actors, without infringing on their independence.
- When it comes to creating a culture of political thought on subjects relating to foreign policy and security, one model could be that of the Nordic countries, where governmental and non-governmental sectors work together on a series of agreed topics without cooperation in any way implying a political dependence. The connections between the academic world, civil society and governments ought to allow for the creation of “affinity groups” for joint work on topics. The EU should support these initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SPANISH AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS

- For development cooperation and peacebuilding to be effective, it is helpful for each country to centre its policies on those areas where it enjoys comparative advantages, perhaps through historical experience (political transition, conflict resolution or decentralisation, as in the case of Spain) or on account of its geographical location (neighbouring countries with potentially conflict-prone backgrounds). This focus should ideally be as much geographical as thematic.
- The drawing up of a document setting out the position of each country regarding peacebuilding is important and even more so if it assumes the participation of civil society. This could be a frame of reference in which

actions already carried out in this area could be placed, along with those envisaged in the future. However, it would be important to improve policy coherence so that peacebuilding is not only regarded as an area specific to cooperation. To be effective, it should affect all areas of the state's external action, including policies on defence, trade, immigration etc.

- It is very important to clarify the meaning of concepts like peacebuilding, since there is still significant confusion over what constitutes “peacebuilding” and about the practical connections between cooperation, ODA and peace. This lack of clarity makes the practical work more challenging. It would be beneficial if the government promoted seminars and meetings between national and international actors involved in this area, in order to contribute to clearer definitions.
- In order to implement tasks aimed at peacebuilding, it is very important for personnel to have the appropriate conceptual training and methodology. Targeted training programmes are necessary.
- The connections between the academic world, civil society and Governments ought to allow for the creation of “affinity groups” for joint work on topics.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL SECTOR

- Spanish NGOs should focus more on theoretical research to reinforce and support their field work by contributing experience and know how. Personnel and resources should be allocated to this endeavour.
- Economic independence should be strengthened and to this end, funding sources must be diversified in order to avoid the present situation whereby NGOs depend largely on central and regional government funds.
- Communication and collaboration between NGOs and think tanks, research centres and the academic sector should be improved in order to share and analyse concepts, discuss ongoing debates, etc. One recommendation is to hold regular meetings in which these aspects could be jointly discussed.
- Although dialogue with the government has improved, it would be beneficial to further develop communication channels with the government, so that NGOs can enhance their lobbying capacity in defining government policies.

ANNEX I. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Jesus Nuñez, Director of the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Aid (IECAH). Telephone interview, 28th August 2008.

Roberto Mansilla, The Galician Institute of Analysis and International Documentation (IGADI). Telephone interview, 29th August 2008.

Ana Martin, Action against Hunger. Telephone interview, 4th September 2008.

Miguel Angel Blanco, Assembly of Cooperation for Peace. Personal interview, 10th September 2008.

Rocio Muñoz and Martin Jerch, The Directorate-General for Planning and Evaluation of Development Policies (DGPOLDE). Personal interview, 11th September 2008.

Arturo Spiegelberg, Special Ambassador for Peacekeeping Operations. Personal interview, 11th September 2008.

Gonzalo Vega, head of The Office for Humanitarian Action, AECID. Personal interview, 17th September 2008.

Irene Milleiro, Intermon Oxfam. Telephone interview, 19th September 2008.

The School for a Culture of Peace, Barcelona Autonomous University. Written questionnaire.

ACSUR Las Segovias. Written questionnaire.

ANNEX II. LIST OF WEBSITES OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND CENTRES MENTIONED IN THE REPORT

Official institutions:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC): www.maec.es
 Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID): www.aecid.es
 Ministry of Defence: www.mde.es
 Chamber of Deputies: www.congreso.es

Research Centres and think tanks

The School for a Culture of Peace, Barcelona Autonomous University: www.pangea.org/unescopau/castellano/index.php
 Toledo International Centre for Peace: www.toledopax.org
 Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH): www.iecah.org
 Pedro Arrupe Human Rights Institute, Deusto University: <http://www.idh.deusto.es/>
 Galician Institute of Analysis and International Documentation (IGADI): www.igadi.org
 Gernika Gogoratuz: www.gernikagogoratuz.org
 Bakeaz: www.bakeaz.org
 The Complutense Institute of International Studies (ICEI): www.ucm.es/info/icei
 Peace and Conflict Institute (University of Granada): <http://cicode-gcubo.ugr.es/eirene>
 African Studies Group at the Autonomous University of Madrid: www.uam.es/gea.html
 Elcano Royal Institute: www.realinstitutoelcano.org
 Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE): www.ieee.es
 Barcelona Centre for International Information and Documentation (CIDOB): www.cidob.org
 Institute of Development and International Cooperation Studies (HEGOA): www.hegoa.ehu.es
 Peace Research Seminar (SEIPAZ): www.seipaz.org
 Peace Research Centre (CIP): www.cip.fuhem.es

NGOs

Network of Spanish Development NGOs (CONGDE): www.congde.org
 Intermón Oxfam: www.intermonoxfam.org
 Action Against Hunger: www.accioncontraelhambre.org
 ACSUR Las Segovias: www.acsur.org
 Assembly of Cooperation for Peace: www.acpp.com

Newspapers

ABC: www.abc.es
 El País: www.elpais.es
 El Mundo: www.elmundo.es
 La Vanguardia: www.lavanguardia.es

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